Siegfried Lenz's novel Deutschstunde is analyzed on the basis of work conducted by two American psychologists: Stanley Milgram and Lawrence Kohlberg. The concept of duty and obedience to authority are considered as social phenomena that go beyond personal disposition. The article uses Milgram's famous obedience experiment in order to consider the literary depiction of psychological processes underlying compliance with orders to commit reprehensible acts.
Siegfried Lenz' Deutschstunde
is a novel about a small-town German policeman, Jens Jepsen, who receives a peculiar order from Berlin toward the end of World War Two. He is supposed to prevent a "degenerate" artist, Max Nansen, from painting. Being a man of duty when it comes to his job, Jens
Jepsen begins to carry out the order. The policeman is not a Nazi zealot or a sadist, but rather an intellectually unimpressive and emotionally dull man who takes his job very seriously. Initially Jens and the painter are friends, but once the painting interdiction comes in, the policeman's role takes over the policeman. Eventually Jens becomes personally obsessed with enforcing the painting interdiction and even burns some of Nansen's canvasses after the war is over! This literary policeman can be contrasted with a real one. In 1940 Paul Grueninger, a Swiss officer of the law at the Austrian border, was dismissed from his job and deprived of his pension. He had been found guilty of disobeying instructions from the Swiss authorities by allowing Austrian refugees to enter Switzerland. Grueninger was very different from his colleagues and perhaps a minority of one since most other police officers knew how to follow orders unquestioningly (François Rochat: 91) . The rarity of Grueninger's behavior points to the purpose behind Lenz' Deutschstunde.
Lenz presents his fictional policeman as a reflection of the millions in Nazi Germany who also "merely" followed orders as they committed abominable acts. The question is why so many people acted like Jepsen and so few like Grueninger? One possible answer may be offered by social psychology.
Psychology features prominently in Deutschstunde because the novel is narrated by the policeman's son, Siggi Jepsen. Siggi is so disturbed by his father's behavior that the boy begins a quest to save Nansen's paintings. This eventually turns into an obsession causing Siggi to steal some paintings in order to protect them. Siggi ends up institutionalized on an island and scrutinized by psychologists from all over the world. However, the issue is whose behavior should be psychologized: Siggi's or Jens'? Although there is no denying that Siggi is disturbed, the novel appears to suggest that the psychologists' gaze is misdirected as Siggi points out himself: "Na gut, dann werde ich Ihnen sagen, warum ich auf der Insel bin. Weil keiner sich traut, Milgram brought people from different social strata to his lab and told them that they were going to participate in an experiment on human memory. Each one of them was to act as a "teacher" who would teach a "learner" (in fact
Milgram's accomplice) something that had to be memorized. If the learner failed at a given memorization task, the teacher was asked to administer an electric shock. It all looked real because the learner was attached with electrodes to a fake electric shock machine. The teachers were told by the experimenter that the first few memory errors required low voltage 6 punishment which elicited a minor reaction from the learner, e.g., "ouch!" But gradually, with every new learning error, the voltage was supposed to be increased until eventually, "at 285 volts [the learner's] response could only be described as an agonizing scream" (Milgram: 4) . The experimenter's position of authority was established by the laboratory setting and the fact that the study was taking place at Yale University, an institution "which most subjects regarded with respect and sometimes awe" (Milgram: 66, .
The results of the experiment were very disturbing and had enormous
implications for understanding what happened in Nazi Germany:
Despite the fact that many [teachers] protested to the experimenter, a substantial proportion continued to the last shock on the generator. [...] Almost two-thirds of the participants fell into the category of 'obedient' subjects. They represented ordinary people drawn from the working, managerial, and professional classes (Milgram: 5) .
Milgram conducted the experiment with various groups of people and altered the format of the situation. The study was repeated at other laboratories by other researchers with results similar to Milgram's. 2 The shocking conclusion appears to be that monstrous deeds do not require monsters at every level.
"Obedience [to authority] is a basic element in the structure of social life" (1), The tension experienced by Jens Jepsen is similar to what Milgram found among his subjects. Many people in the obedience experiment protested against their task even while administering electric shock. The degree of protest varied, but the key issue here is that very few of Milgram's subjects calmly hurt the accomplice, although hurt him they did. They were all torn between two imperatives: "A conflict develops between the deeply ingrained disposition not to harm others and the equally compelling tendency to obey others who are in authority. The subject is quickly drawn into a dilemma, and the presence of high tension points to the considerable strength of each of the antagonistic vectors" . In the case of Jens Jepsen the vector that wins out is the order to prevent Max Nansen from painting, i.e., obedience to authority. However, as the passages quoted above demonstrate, the policeman still experiences what Milgram refers to as "strain": "If the individual's submergence in the authority system were total, he would feel no tension as he followed commands [...] . Every sign of tension, therefore, is evidence of the failure of authority to transform the person to an unalloyed state of agency" (155).
In order to downplay any notion of inherent evil in Jens Jepsen, Lenz contrasts the "dutiful" policeman with the latter's wife Gudrun. She is presented as truly "demonic," sadistic and very much in tune with Nazi ideology, manipulating her husband at every step. Robert H. because she is a figure of authority, but generally he appears to be too simpleminded for the consideration of the political meaning behind his actions (cf.
Murdoch and Read: 61). Jens Jepsen's concern has to do only with obedience: Although in Jens' case, the obedience urge is exaggerated for artistic purposes, it is by no means an anomaly. Milgram tries to explain the extent to which the obedience urge is ingrained in most people as follows:
From his very first years [a person] is exposed to parental regulation, whereby a sense of respect for adult authority is inculcated. [...] As soon as the child emerges from the cocoon of the family, he is transferred to an institutional system of authority, the school. [...] The first twenty years of the young person's life are spent functioning as a subordinate element in an authority system, and upon leaving school, the male usually moves into either a civilian job or military service. On the job, he learns that although some discreetly expressed dissent is allowable, an underlying posture of submission is required for harmonious functioning with superiors (135-7).
This inculcated need to obey authority appears to be the mechanism behind the transformation of Jens Jepsen's behavior. As the painting interdiction process continues, the policeman's initial tension and embarrassment gradually disappear, and Jens Jepsen starts to go about his task with more an observing our own behavior. It is obvious that we define others on this basis, but that we also form our own self-image in the same way may seem less self-
evident. Collins and Ma ask what caused events like the Kristallnacht: inherent
German anti-Semitism, a peculiar quirk of the "German mentality" or something else?
Participation in, say, Kristallnacht may have served the function of reaffirming and expressing the ordinary individual's sense of identity. This analysis is compatible with the assertion that the anti-Semitism of the person on the street caused the Holocaust (e.g., Goldhagen, 1996) . The inclusion of self-perception theory (i.e., how our behaviors feed back into our own identities) in the present analysis also leads one to turn that (anti-Semitism caused the Holocaust casual sequence) around. Self-perception theory, unlike Milgram's theory of the agentic state, would postulate that an individual would need to feel choice or responsibility for each anti-Semitic act in order for that act to feed back into an anti-Semitic self-view and public image. In other words, it may have been the cumulation of the concrete, behavioral minutiae of the Holocaust and its prolegomena that, in part, intensified the anti-Semitism of the perpetrators" (87, emphasis mine -V.T.).
In this analysis, ordinary people may be compelled by a given situation (involving obedience to authority) to commit a distasteful act, which would fit into Milgram's experimental findings. And that act, when considered retrospectively, redefines the self in the mind of the perpetrator. Thus, for example, a person with latent anti-Semitic feelings (or even with no such feelings at all) may have been pressured by some authority source in one way or another to support or even commit anti-Semitic aggression (at a Nazi rally, at work, in the street). But once that happens, the perpetrator's identity begins to change along the lines of: "Aha! Now I am the kind of person who does such things." When several such actions occur, a person's sense of self may change radically, leading to new behaviors and ideas which gradually cease to be foreign to us. We need to maintain a coherent picture of our identities, which would explain this circular process of self-redefinition. To be consistent we begin to act in line with our new identity, sucked in more and more into an evil vortex that refuses to let us go.
If this self-perception theory is applied to Lenz's policeman, we can offer a possible explanation of Jens' gradual change in attitude toward his task and toward the painter. Part of Jens' initial self-definition is that he is not the sort of person who betrays friends and neighbors. We learn that Jens is not just the local policeman but someone who socializes with the painter's family: The policeman is not "gleichgültig" because, according to his present selfdefinition, his task constitutes an antisocial act in the context of interpersonal bonding, hence his nervousness and discomfort. However, as Jens' need to obey authority pushes him into betraying Nansen after all, the policeman redefines himself in a way that incorporates the betrayal and maintains a coherent sense of self. This is why he eventually loses his nervousness, continues the betrayal with more and more energy and even condemns the The individual is not the source of potential new activity in the world, but rather a superfluity which will only obtain meaning upon the assumption of a fixed role in a finished world.
[...] The individual is therefore the passive product of the totality of his experiences. [...] Thus, the process of determination which molds the passive individual from without marks simultaneously the gradual construction of a new world within" (459, emphasis mine -V.T.)
This essay was started with a comparison between Lenz' fictional policeman who obeys authority and a real Swiss policeman, Paul Grueninger, who disobeyed.
Just as it was argued above that Jens Jepsen is presented as rather dull and apolitical, so too Grueninger had no apparent interest in politics, nor for that matter did he have an affinity for any ideology [...] although he was very attentive to his responsibilities as chief of police, especially his duty to protect people against crime. In a way, protecting the refugees from their persecutors was an extension of this understanding of his duties. What he was doing at the Swiss border, to the extent possible, was protecting refugees from the criminal acts of their persecutors" (Rochat: 107).
Thus, we have two individuals -a literary character and a real person -who are very much taken with the notion of duty but act upon their respective understandings in opposite ways. In order to account for this, let us turn to the work of the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, a Yale colleague of Milgram, who took an interest in the Milgram's findings.
According to Kohlberg, humans in many societies pass through a set of stages as they develop morally. The first stage corresponds to early childhood and is based on a definition of morality in terms of punishment. Thus, a young child will steal a cookie as long as no one sees it. The second stage is based on exchange, i.e., one will treat another person well only if something can be received in exchange for the good treatment. These two stages are presocial, and adults who stagnate at this point in their moral development are often con-men or criminals. As the individual grows, progression to stage three takes place. Here group approval is what determines right and wrong. Thus, whatever one's in-group may be (a tribe, a gang, a clique, a team or a school), the group's attitude will guide the individual's actions. This is the beginning of society, but only a rudimentary and usually small social unit can function at stage three. The next stage is of greatest interest to us for two reasons: most adults stop developing here (Kohlberg: 46) and Jens Jepsen in Deutschstunde epitomizes stage four: "There is an orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake" (Kohlberg: 18).
Kohlberg points out that stage four thinking is normally uncritical and boils down to observing the law. Therefore, this type of moral reasoning is normally what characterizes the proverbial "upstanding citizen" and yet, under certain circumstances, can lead to terrible deeds committed by ordinary people. This is illustrated in Lenz' novel by a conversation between Okko Brodersen, the town's mailman, and Jens Jepsen. The mailman points out Max Nansen's greatness as a painter and appears to reject the reasons behind the interdiction at least on that basis. But Jens counters with the follwing example of stage four thinking: "Wer seine Pflicht tut, der braucht sich keine Sorgen zu machen" (Lenz: 102). There is no need for Jens to analyze the law or the nature of the authority behind the law because the law is self-serving -like a part of nature. It is from the letter rather than the spirit of the law that Jepsen derives his "upstanding citizen" concept. This is why making the transition to post-Nazi rule in 1945 is so easy for Lenz' policeman:
Drei Monate nur hatte es keinen Polzeiposten Rugbüll gegeben, doch dann tauchte er wieder auf mit seinem trockenen Gesicht und den schlecht sitzenden Hosen und übernahm sein Amt mit einer Selbsverständlichkeit, als hätte er keinen erzwungenen, sondern einen freiwilligen Urlaub gemacht (Lenz: 343).
As long as there is authority (Nazi or not), it must obeyed. And the extent to which this was the norm for millions under Hitler can be glimpsed from the following comment that Jens makes to the painter in response to Nansen's rejection of the painting interdiction: "Du bist so, sagte mein Vater, du allein. Nansen is trying to make Jens think about the reasons and persons behind the painting interdiction but, needless to say, does not get through the impenetrable wall of stage four morality.
If, however, Nansen were addressing the Swiss policeman Paul Grueninger, he would undoubtedly encounter a very different reaction. As Rochat points out (see quoted passage above), Grueninger's understanding of duty amounted to protecting those exposed to a malevolent force. In fact, Kohlberg argues that there is even a stage six, the ultimate one in the moral development process, and extremely few people ever reach it. According to Kohlberg's scheme it can be assumed that Grueninger did function at something like stage six by disobeying an unjust law. Kohlberg's example of this mindset is Martin Luther King as is evident from the latter's famous "Letter from a Birmingham Jail":
"One has the moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. [...] An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself" (quoted in Kohlberg: 43) .
Essentially, stage six is about human rights and the assumption that every moral decision must be guided not just by its impact on society in general, but also by the way a given individual human being is affected. Some have pointed out that the difference between stages five and six is vague, but what interests us here is that in Lenz' Deutschstunde and in the drama of Paul Grueninger, we witness the confrontation between stage-four morality and the ethics of stage 5/6. For a brief instant Lenz' marionette-like policeman seems to regain his humanity, but then he quickly caves in and becomes an automaton under the overwhelming weight of social structures. Given the appropriate prod by his wife, Jens accepts that Klaas must be reported to the Nazi authorities, i.e., he does what most of Milgram's subjects did in spite of their inner conflict.
Authority wins out in the end, and everyone loses.
One may be tempted to argue that Lenz demonstrates obedience to authority in an authoritarian society.
Presumably things should be different in a democracy. However, given that Milgram's study dealt with subjects in a democratic society, the obedience urge seems to be more than just a political issue. In fact Milgram argues that it is essential in any social system: "The formation of hierarchically organized groupings lends enormous advantage to those so organized in coping with dangers of the physical environment, threats posed by competing species, and potential disruptions from within" (123-4).
Our point of focus is "disruptions from within" and the way complex social systems deal with this potential for imbalance. Although authoritarianism is a common response to this potential, Milgram is careful to point out that atrocities were committed by American soldiers in the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam war (183-6). That too was a form of obedience to authority even though it took place within an army that represented a pluralistic society. If we add to this the recent cases of prisoner abuse in Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison, we can argue that the portrait of German society painted in Deutschstunde appears to go beyond an indictment of Nazism or a trait of the German mentality. To quote Brian Murdoch and Malcolm Read, "the moral of the story may apply equally to any society and to regard it, and the problem of duty, simply as the German virtue that became the German vice, is to assume a moral certainty about ourselves that Lenz warns against" (74).
